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Introduction
"The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges we must confront." -Executive Order 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
Protection of critical infrastructure components is vitally important to industrial control systems (ICSs). Undetected cyber attacks are a threat to human life and may incur significant material losses and detrimentally impact the reputation of entire industries. This technical report reviews recent malware threats and provides recommendations for computer network defense (CND) to maintain the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the ICS infrastructure.
ICS Cyber Vulnerabilities
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) catalogues ICS vulnerabilities and identified the most common ones. These metrics are derived from security assessments of new ICS products as well as assessments of ICS installations conducted from 2004 to 2010. Included in the metrics are vulnerabilities learned from the DHS Control System Security Program (CSSP) site assessments, ICS Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) activities, and asset owner evaluations using the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET). The top 3 cyber vulnerabilities are presented in Table 1. 1 
ICS Cyber Threats
Malware attacks comprise the main cause of ICS incidents as presented in Table 2 . 2 Software errors and failure of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) components are the 2nd and 3rd reasons, respectively, of ICS incidents. As shown in Table 3 , corporate networks are the most common threat vector for malware to enter process control networks.
2 Table 3 Sources of malware in ICS systems
Source of Malware Percentage
Corporate network 35%
Remote access 26%
Outside contractors 10%
Internet connections 9%
Human-machine interface (HMI) 8%
Wi-Fi 5%
Mobile devices 4%
Universal serial bus (USB) 3%
Malware does not have to deploy a malicious payload to impact ICS processes. If malware causes 100% central processing unit (CPU) load on a server or controller, this may harm process automation safety or operations since ICS processes require deterministic communications. In considering an approach to mitigate risks due to cyber threats, a review of recent malware will be helpful to understand their characteristics and identify countermeasures.
Survey of Recent Malware
Analysis of recent malware attacks illuminates how malware persists and spreads through a network. The characteristics of Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, Shamoon, and 2 remote access Trojans (RATs) developed by the Energetic Bear group are presented and lessons learned derived. Table 4 presents the characteristics of recent malware in how the malware was introduced to the victim site, how it spread, and the damage caused. The "Dropper Method" column explains how the malware was introduced into the victim's environment. The "Malware Spreading Method" column describes the lateral movement of the malware through the target organization. The "Persistence Method" column presents how the malware is restarted after the infected system is rebooted. The "Command and Control" column reveals how the malware communicates with the attackers. The Duqu launcher was disguised as a system driver file and was signed with a stolen certificate. At system initialization, the launcher then injected Duqu into the services.exe process. Duqu unpacked and injected itself into other trusted processes. 6 Infected computers encrypted stolen data and sent the data to C&C servers using HTTP (port 80) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) (port 443). Some data were embedded into graphics files to obfuscate network activity. Infected victim computers which connect to the Internet acted as a proxy for compromised computers within a secure zone. The computers in a secure zone sent their data to the proxy using a file-sharing protocol. The proxy forwarded the data to the C&C servers. 6 Cyber espionage. Captures keystrokes, focused on data mining and reconnaissance. Recorded data were encrypted and sent to C&C servers using HTTPS on ports 443 and 8080. 9 Flame also downloaded modules from C&C servers. The C&C layer consisted of multiple domains. 10 Cyber espionage, Flame recorded keystrokes, network traffic, and screenshots. Flame also recorded Skype conversations and used Bluetooth to download contact info from cell phones, which was then sent to C&C servers. 8, 10 Shamoon (W32.Dist Track)
Malware Characteristics
Initial infection vector is unknown. 11 The malicious executables were encrypted in the resources section of the dropper. The dropper installed Shamoon in the Windows system folder, replaced a driver file with a digitally signed wiper, and created a service. Shamoon could infect 32-and 64-bit Windows operating systems. 12 Enumerated IP addresses of local computer and then spreads via Admin$ shares. After Shamoon copied itself to the remote computer, it executed a task to run Shamoon on the newly infected host. 13 Shamoon created a Windows service which automatically launched Shamoon when Windows starts.
Shamoon sent data about the host IP address, domain, and number of files overwritten to the C&C server using HTTP GET request. 12 Shamoon overwrote files with an image and then overwrote the master boot record, preventing the PC from booting. The overwritten data was lost.
6 
Lessons Learned From Malware
The behaviors of the malware described in Table 4 provide many lessons to be considered when designing defenses to protect ICS networks:
• Certificates cannot be relied to guarantee the provenance of driver files and patches. Flame distributed itself disguised as Microsoft patches using a forged code-signing certificate. Stuxnet used 2 stolen code-signing certificates to masquerade as driver files.
• Each malware sample connected to a C&C server. In addition, Stuxnet and Duqu established peer-to-peer connections between infected hosts in secure enclaves with an infected host acting as proxy to a C&C server. Most of the malware could receive updated modules from the attackers and could execute commands as directed by them. While some malware could function without additional modules from C&C servers, the outgoing, persistent connections to transfer data are an indicator of compromise (IOC).
• Data sent from the malware to the C&C servers were sent outgoing in encrypted payloads. Outgoing Internet connections are not normally blocked by enterprise firewalls.
• Some malware exploited zero-day vulnerabilities as well as attempted to exploit vulnerabilities for which Microsoft already had patches available.
The duration between discovery of the zero-day vulnerabilities and the release of patches was several months. Even after a patch is released, additional time is needed to test the patches prior to deployment.
Comparison of ICS and IT Systems
Strategies for mitigating cyber risks on ICS components must take into account unique characteristics of their components and emphasis on availability and safety. Since process control network components can be in service for up to 20 years, the attack surfaces that we are aware of today were unknown when these components were designed. Process components built 15 to 20 years ago may not have the resources (e.g., memory or processor speed) to accept new firmware or other patches to mitigate vulnerabilities. Also, protocols designed 20 years ago were not designed for confidentiality or integrity. As a result, ICS components relying on these older protocols are susceptible to replay attacks. Modbus is a common ICS protocol developed in 1979 and does not have security elements, even in the version for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) transport. 18 New patches require extensive testing. Deploying a patch may need to wait several months until the process component can be taken offline and patched. As a result, the processes and solutions to mitigate cyber threats in an IT environment may not be appropriate for process networks.
ICS Cyber Risk Mitigation
Because the enterprise and process control networks are no longer protected by an air gap and these 2 networks can be inadvertently directly connected, we recommend protecting process control networks with defense in depth to slow the spread of malware and using both signature and behavior sensors to detect IOCs caused by malware.
Recommendations when Acquiring New Components
When purchasing new ICS components, include requirements for compliance with information assurance (IA) controls. The Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group (ESCWG) has recommendations for request for proposal (RFP) language to specify required IA controls and post-sale processes with vendors.
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A summary of the IA controls and processes to be specified in RFPs follows.
Encryption
Some vendors use their proprietary encryption and these algorithms have not withstood public crypto analysis. Require that vendors implement approved algorithms, which are listed in the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2. Only specify secure protocols to be used to ensure data integrity and prevent replay attacks.
Software Quality
Request the vendor provide documentation of secure software coding practices such as using static analysis tools. Some commercial software store passwords in plain text or use hard-coded passwords. Stuxnet exploited a hard-coded password that had been posted on Internet websites.
Access Controls
Specify the software use customer-defined, role-based access controls. Each role should have the minimum privileges necessary for the task. Two-factor authentication should be specified for remote access and elevated privileges.
Unused Software
Most ICS software is delivered on Windows or Linux distributions. In the RFP, specify that all unused software, drivers, ports, and protocols be removed or disabled. This reduces the attack surface available to malware and reduces the need to install patches for services that are unused. Verifying that unused software is removed or disabled should be part of the site acceptance test (SAT).
Intrusion Detection
A host-based security system is needed to detect malware and root kits as well as enforce security policies. Request the vendor include a host-based malware detection product or recommend one. If the vendor is unable to recommend this type of product, request the vendor recommend an application whitelisting tool.
In order to implement anomaly detection, request information on normal communications ports, protocols, and network traffic patterns.
Patches
Vendors typically do not publically disclose software vulnerabilities until a patch is ready, and the time between the initial report of a zero-day vulnerability and the released patch could be several months. Request the vendor provide information about all software vulnerabilities, including those not publically disclosed, and the vendor's recommendations for mitigations to be implemented until a patch can be released. Specify that the vendor will provide a patch within a set time period to mitigate critical vulnerabilities.
In addition to fixing critical vulnerabilities, request the vendor to provide a process on how customers can verify the integrity of patches and other software delivered. The Energetic Bear group modified the installation programs of 3 ICS vendors, which caused RATs to be installed in customer networks.
Recommendations to Secure Existing Systems
The overall strategy to thwart malware is to prevent malware from spreading and detect its presence, which enables defenders to contain the malware. Based upon threats posed by malware and behavior of recent APTs, the following recommendations are provided to organizations to protect their critical infrastructure:
1. Conduct a threat risk assessment to identify the most common attack vectors, their severity of impact, and probability of occurring. Based on the risk assessment, establish defense in depth in the process control network with security zones in accordance with International Society for Automation/International Electrotechnical Commission-62443 (ISA/IEC-62443) standard. 20 A security zone is a group of assets that share common security requirements and restricting data flows to only those endpoints that exchange information will slow the spread of malware.
2. Since 35% of malware enters via corporate networks, recommend all email attachments and downloaded files to be screened for malicious content. Most malware is encrypted and will have higher entropy than innocuous content.
5. Establish a baseline trend of all outgoing network connections as well as monitor the duration and the amount of data sent out from these outgoing connections. Investigate outgoing connections that have the longest connection times and most data sent out as possible malware beacons and data exfiltration activity. Capture packets from these connections and assess if the data sent out are encrypted or obfuscated as 1 IOC.
6. Install ICS-aware firewalls with deep packet inspection (DPI) to protect controllers such as PLCs and remote terminal units (RTUs). An ICS firewall with DPI is preferred over a corporate IT firewall, because the DPI feature will inspect the commands sent to controllers and verify the command is permitted. An example of a command that is suspicious is a remote user conducting a firmware upgrade. Not all IT commercial firewalls can parse commands from ICS protocols.
7. Implement port security to prevent unauthorized devices connecting to the process control network.
8. Restrict process control network user privileges to only those required for the person's job, preferably with role-based access control 9. The process and corporate networks should have their own separate infrastructure services. Examples of this are separate Active Directory (AD) servers, separate patch repositories, separate dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) servers, and separate domain name system (DNS) servers. The AD servers on the process and corporate networks should not have a trust relationship. This separation of infrastructure services is necessary to prevent malware on the corporate network penetrating the process control network.
10. The process control network data historian should share data with the corporate network only through a one-way data diode. This reduces the risk of a structured query language (SQL) injection attack from the corporate network.
11. Configure the intrusion detection system (IDS) to alert if a firewall rule is permitting blocked traffic through. If the IDS alerts on traffic that should be blocked, the firewall administrator can take corrective action on the firewall configuration.
12. Harden ICS equipment by disabling all unnecessary services and network daemons. Some equipment is delivered with Telnet and file transfer protocol (FTP) services installed, which have well-known vulnerabilities. Recommend unnecessary services be disabled during SAT to reduce the attack surface. During SAT, the equipment should be thoroughly tested with these unneeded services disabled. Once the equipment is installed, disabling the services will be difficult while maintaining high availability. An example of an open vulnerability is very small aperture terminal (VSAT) stations installed with a Telnet server running with weak passwords and accessible to anyone on the Internet. 21 13. Periodically verify the firmware in controllers is the correct version. One attack is to reverse engineer firmware and insert malicious code into firmware and then deploy this version into controllers.
14. Install honey pots within the process control network. If logs show activity within the honey pot, then further investigation should be initiated to determine which boundary protection has been penetrated.
15. Disable web and email access for administrative accounts. This prevents administrators downloading email attachments with malicious code and prevents the possibility of installing malware via Trojan downloads and browser exploits.
16. Use two-factor authentication for privileged root level access and remote access. This eliminates obtaining access using weak passwords or factory set accounts.
17. Prevent malware from surviving reboots by restricting permissions to write files to the Windows system folders and restricting the creation of registry entries.
Conclusions
ICSs were once thought to be completely isolated and therefore unreachable to malware. However, ICSs are, in many cases, no longer "air gapped" and may be inadvertently connected to a corporate network, therefore making them vulnerable to malware originating on the Internet. Besides threats originating from external networks, removeable media can also allow malware to enter a process network. To protect critical infrastructure, it is recommended that asset owners conduct a security risk analysis of existing plant networks as well as plans for new plant automation. They should identify cyber risks and implement defense in depth to protect critical assets. Defense in depth should be implemented with layers of technical security controls (e.g., ICS-aware firewalls) to control network traffic and prevent the spread of malware. Intrusion detection technologies should be deployed between each defensive layer to warn of the presence of a cyber attack. Critical assets should be protected by the most number of defensive layers. 
